The  U.S. at least has a innermost banker who seems to comprehend the  risk.In the face of his connivance in getting us into this mess in the  first place, Ben Bernanke has shown he understands the risks that  deflation poses, especially in a debt-laden economy,and believes that he  has ample tools to thwart deflation from gaining traction in the  economy(even with rates at zero).
Generally, we simply can't bring  ourselves to own bonds at the yields on offer in most markets  today.However,that doesn't mean we are ignoring the short-term risks. So  whilst we are generally inclined to be short nominal duration across  portfolios (as suggested by the 7-year forecasts),we have been adding  nominal duration. How can one add nominal duration when bonds are  overpriced?Doesn't this imply that we are betraying our value investing  credentials?In early 2009, Christina Romer, Chair of the Council of  Economic Advisers, gave a speech laying out six lessons from the Great  Depression.
     Lesson I: Small fiscal expansion  has only small effects. Lesson II: Monetary expansion can help to heal  an economy even when interest rates are near zero. Lesson III: Beware of  cutting back on stimulus too soon. Lesson IV: Financial recovery and  real recovery go together. Lesson V: Worldwide expansionary policy  shares the burdens and the benefits of recovery. Lesson VI: The Great  Depression did eventually end.
The European sovereign debt crisis of  spring 2010 was a misnomer in more ways than one: there was not one  crisis but two. And it will continue well beyond 2010, in our view. The  first crisis was, and remains, an institutional crisis of the euro,  caused by a flawed multilateral fiscal surveillance framework. This is  reflected by the acceptance by the Greek, Spanish and Portuguese  governments of fiscal measures largely dictated from Berlin and  Brussels. The second crisis was, and remains, a sovereign debt crisis: a  crisis caused by sovereign balance sheets being overstretched, to the  point where insolvency ceases to be merely possible and becomes  plausible. This crisis is not limited to the periphery of Europe. It is a  global crisis and it is far from over.However there are good reasons  why government bonds should rank senior to most other liabilities.To  mention one: governments need to be able to raise finance to fund public  investment as well as to perform their macroeconomic stabilization  role. They cannot issue equity,and cannot credibly issue secured debt2.  Unrestricted access to unsecured, confidence-based funding is core to  their 'business model',as it is for banks. This was, historically at  least,the main argument for honoring sovereign debt.There are others,not  least the consequences of a government default for output and for  financial stability when banks own substantial exposure to the  sovereign.













